AUKUS and nuclear non-proliferation

Why Australia's submarines will be nuclear-powered but not nuclear-armed, and how the International Atomic Energy Agency is involved.

Explainer · Updated 26 October 2026

AUKUS submarines will run on nuclear reactors. That raises an obvious question: does it bring Australia closer to nuclear weapons? The three governments say no, and they have set out specific commitments. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN-linked body that checks countries' nuclear material, is also involved. This page sets out what has been committed and where the process stands.

Nuclear-powered, conventionally armed

The submarines are described as conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines [2][3]. "Nuclear-powered" refers to the reactor that drives the boat. "Conventionally armed" means the weapons are not nuclear.

When AUKUS was announced in 2021, the leaders said the partnership was consistent with each country's nuclear non-proliferation obligations [1]. In 2023 they committed to "setting the highest non-proliferation standard" for Australia's acquisition [2].

The specific commitments

The March 2023 White House fact sheet listed the commitments the three nations made [2]:

As a non-nuclear-weapon state, Australia does not, and will not, seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
Australia will not enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel as part of the program.
Australia will not produce its own nuclear fuel for the submarines.
The UK and US intend to provide nuclear material in complete, welded power units that will not need refuelling during their lifetime.
The fuel Australia receives cannot be used in nuclear weapons without further chemical processing, which would need facilities Australia does not have and will not seek.
The program will happen within the framework of Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

The Prime Minister's release said Australia and its partners would work "in continued close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency" [3].

Radioactive waste

The fact sheet said Australia committed to managing all radioactive waste from the program, including spent nuclear fuel, in Australia, with help from the UK and US [2]. A parliamentary committee noted the Australian Submarine Agency has said it will manage waste according to international best practice [7].

The 2024 trilateral agreement

On 5 August 2024, the three countries signed an agreement for cooperation related to naval nuclear propulsion. The IAEA says its purpose is to set up a legally binding framework for sharing naval nuclear propulsion information, and for transferring propulsion plants, nuclear material and equipment from the UK and US to Australia [4].

According to the IAEA, under this agreement Australia is required to [4]:

use transferred nuclear material only for naval nuclear propulsion;
not enrich or reprocess any nuclear material it receives;
be responsible for the management, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste from the transferred propulsion plants.

Safeguards and the Article 14 arrangement

Australia has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, made in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [5]. Under a CSA, a country accepts IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities [5].

The CSA has a provision, Article 14, for nuclear material used in a non-proscribed military activity, such as naval propulsion. If Australia uses material that way, specific procedures apply [5]. Australia has told the IAEA it considers all relevant parts of its CSA, including Article 14, and its Additional Protocol to apply, as well as extra verification measures that may include enhanced transparency and access [5].

Key points from the IAEA:

Australia must have an Article 14 arrangement and any necessary implementing mechanisms in place before the UK or US transfers any nuclear material to Australia for naval propulsion [4].
In its November 2025 report, the IAEA said discussions with Australia on the technical aspects, structure and content of the Article 14 arrangement were continuing, including on verification, monitoring and voluntary transparency measures [5].
Once finalised, the Director General will send the arrangement to the IAEA Board of Governors for appropriate action [5].
Since March 2023, Australia has provided the required information under its CSA and Additional Protocol, and the IAEA has carried out in-field verification activities in Australia and a transparency visit [5].

The Geelong Treaty

The Australia-UK Geelong Treaty, signed on 26 July 2025, is described by both governments as consistent with their non-proliferation obligations, including under the NPT, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and its Protocols, and Australia's safeguards agreements with the IAEA [6]. Read more in our SSN-AUKUS explainer.

Safety record cited by the partners

The 2023 fact sheet said that for over 60 years the UK and US have operated more than 500 naval nuclear reactors without incident or adverse effect on human health or the environment, and that Australia is committed to the same standards [2]. A parliamentary committee noted that Australia passed the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act 2024 [7].

Where this fits

Non-proliferation runs through the whole submarine timeline. The Article 14 arrangement has to be in place before nuclear material is transferred for the Virginia-class submarines and, later, SSN-AUKUS. For the basics of the partnership, see What is AUKUS?

Frequently asked questions

Will AUKUS submarines carry nuclear weapons?

No. They are described as conventionally armed, and Australia has committed that it does not and will not seek nuclear weapons [2].

Will Australia enrich uranium?

No. Australia has committed not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel as part of the program, and not to make its own submarine fuel [2][4].

What is the Article 14 arrangement?

An arrangement under Article 14 of Australia's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, covering nuclear material used for naval propulsion. It must be in place before any nuclear material is transferred, and was still being negotiated as of November 2025 [4][5].

Sources

Checked 26 Oct 2026. AUKUS Defense is an independent site, not affiliated with any government. Plans and figures may change; check the sources above for the latest.